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Abstract
This paper examines the role of return policies in common value auctions. We ﬁrst
characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions
with continuous signals and discrete common values when certain return policies are
provided. We then examine how the return policies aﬀect a seller’s revenue. When the
lowest common value is zero, a more generous return policy generates a higher seller’s
revenue; the full refund policy extracts all the surplus and therefore implements the
optimal selling mechanism; given any return policy, a second-price auction generates a
higher revenue than a ﬁrst-price auction. In a second-price auction where the lowest
common value is not zero but still smaller than the seller’s reservation value, then a
more generous return policy also generates a higher revenue; otherwise, the optimal
return policy could be a full refund, no refund or partial refund policy.
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11 Introduction
Auctions have been used for trading for thousands of years. Due to the rapid growth of
internet commerce, online auctions have become extremely popular. These auctions create
a problem for both the buyers and the sellers. As a buyer is unable to closely examine the
good being auctioned, he may ﬁnd the good not exactly what he expects when he receives
it. Even though this could also happen in store purchases, it is inarguably a more common
problem in online auctions. Should sellers allow buyers to return the goods? Should sellers
charge a fee for the returns? How would the return policy aﬀect buyers’ behavior? Would
sellers also beneﬁt from such a return policy? These are the issues we will investigate in this
paper.
Each day, there are millions of objects being auctioned on the internet through many
online auction sites. We observe that many of the sellers provide very generous return
policies in the auctions.1 The NHL (National Hockey League) online auctions, for example,
provide a 7-Day, 100% Money-Back Guarantee. Most sellers in Amazon.com and eBay.com
provide at least partial return policies; buyers may need to pay some fees (usually less than
15% of the transaction prices) if they would like to return the merchandises.
Traditionally, standardized consumption goods are categorized as having private values.
Non-standardized goods, especially those with uncertain quality, are categorized as having
interdependent values.2 With private values, return policies do not aﬀect a buyer’s bidding
strategy, since he never bids more than his valuation. As a result, they bid the same as if
there were no return policy.3 In contrast, with interdependent values, return policies induce
bidders to bid more aggressively. Return happens with positive probability after the winning
bidder receives the good and learns more about its true value. We focus on the common
value setting in Wilson [17] since it is the simplest model accounting for interdependent and
correlated values.4 The common value auctions in Wilson [17] are also widely used to model
auctions for oil, gas and mineral rights.
The phenomenon, known as the winner’s curse, is well recognized in the common value
auctions.5 The fact of winning actually conveys bad information that the winner may have
overestimated the object. If buyers do not take this eﬀect into account, they get lower or
even negative expected surplus. However, when buyers are fully rational and they fully
anticipate the winner’s curse, they will adjust their bids downward accordingly, and will not
1Return policies (or money back guarantees) are widely adopted in retailer stores as well. Most large
chain stores have some form of full return policy.
2Haile [4] examines auctions of goods which have common value components due to resale.
3Zhang [20] considers private values which are subject to idiosyncratic shocks after transaction, and
illustrates how return policies can be part of the optimal mechanism.
4Ideally, the most general model to use is Milgrom and Weber [14]. Unfortunately, with return policies,
it is hard to characterize the equilibria. Nevertheless, the insight should be more or less the same.
5The winner’s curse is ﬁrst pointed out by Capen et al. [1]. Kagel and Levin [7] documents the winner’s
curse in experimental designs.
2bid more than their estimates of the value conditional on winning. As the number of buyers
increases, the winner’s curse becomes more severe and buyers bid even less.
However, if a return policy is in place, buyers will bid more aggressively since the winner
can get a refund by returning the object if he discovers that he has overestimated its value.
As a result, the return policy overcomes some of the winner’s curse. In fact, a return policy
can do more than mitigating the winner’s curse. When the return policy is generous enough,
buyers may bid more than the unconditional estimates of the object value. If the seller
implements the full refund policy, then it is obvious that every bidder will bid very high in
the auction. Of course, returns would negatively impact the seller’s revenue as well as the
eﬃciency of trading, as the seller usually has a lower value for keeping the object unsold.
By selecting a proper return policy, the seller can achieve higher revenue by balancing the
trade-oﬀ between higher bids and eﬃciency loss.
In theory, there exist optimal mechanisms for sellers to maximize revenue.6 However,
those optimal mechanisms are not commonly observed in reality, partly because too much
detail regarding the underlining environment is required for the seller to design an optimal
mechanism. The discrepancy between theory and common practice prompts the claim that a
set of simplicity and robustness criteria should be imposed on the trading mechanisms.7 Our
auction model with return policies satisﬁes those simplicity criteria, and the return policies
do not depend on much of the detail of the environment. As we shall show in this paper,
return policies, while being “simple” instruments, are eﬀective in revenue improving.
In our common value auction models with return policies, buyers receive independent
signals conditional upon the true common value of the object. While this common value
takes discrete values, signals are continuously distributed. A more generous return policy
has three eﬀects. First, it induces buyers to bid more aggressively. This is a positive eﬀect.
Second, the seller receives a smaller portion of the transaction price when the winning bidder
returns the object. This is a negative eﬀect. We call the sum of these two eﬀects as the
payment eﬀect. It can be shown that the payment eﬀect is usually positive. Third, returns
change the eﬃciency of the object allocation. This is called the eﬃciency eﬀect, which could
be either positive or negative. How a return policy aﬀects the seller’s revenue depends on
the magnitude of the payment eﬀect and the eﬃciency eﬀect.
Our analysis shows that a return policy can often improve a seller’s revenue. Under
certain conditions, the full refund policy extracts all the surplus and implements the op-
timal selling mechanism. Although return policies are commonly observed only in online
auctions, they should be an eﬀective instrument to improve revenue in any auctions with
6The optimal auction with independent values has been established by Myerson [15]. Matthews [11] and
Maskin and Riley [10] characterize the optimal mechanism with risk averse buyers and independent values.
With correlated values, (almost) full surplus extraction can be achieved using the mechanism in Cremer and
Mclean [2] and McAfee and Reny [12].
7Hurwicz [6] illustrates the need for mechanisms that are independent of the parameters of the model.
Wilson [19] points out that a desirable property of a trading rule is that it “does not rely on features of the
agents”. Lopomo [8] [9] restricts to mechanisms with “simplicity” and “robustness”.
3interdependent values.
There is a huge literature on auctions. The equilibria of common value auctions have
already been extensively examined (see Goeree and Oﬀerman [3], Hausch [5], Milgrom and
Weber [13], Reece [16], and Wilson [18]). Milgrom and Weber [14] consider a very general
model which includes the private values and common values as special cases. However, none
of the above papers consider return policies. To the best of our knowledge, Zhang [20] and
this paper are the ﬁrst ones to analyze return policies in auctions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. In Section
3, we characterize the bidders’ equilibrium strategies in second-price auctions. In Section 4,
we characterize the bidders’ equilibrium strategies in ﬁrst-price auctions. In Section 5, we
establish the revenue rankings among diﬀerent auction formats. In Section 6, we conclude.
All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 The model
Suppose that there are two bidders, bidders 1 and 2.8 The common value of the object,
V , can be either VH or VL with VH > VL. Assume that V = VH with probability µH,
and V = VL with probability µL = 1 − µH. Bidders know the distribution of the common
value but not its true value before the auction. Bidder i receives a signal xi, i = 1,2. This
signal is correlated to the common value, V , but independently distributed across bidders
conditional on V . If V = VH, then xi follows the distribution with p.d.f. fH(·) and c.d.f.
FH(·). If V = VL, then xi follows the distribution with p.d.f. fL(·) and c.d.f. FL(·). Assume
that FH(·) and FL(·) have a common support, [x,x]. To ensure that a higher signal implies
a higher probability of V = VH, we will assume that ρ(x) =
fH(x)
fL(x) is increasing in x, i.e., FH
dominates FL in likelihood ratio. The lemma below lists a few properties implied by this
assumption. The proof is standard and is thus omitted.
Lemma 1 Suppose that FH(x) dominates FL(x) in likelihood ratio, i.e., ρ(x) is increasing
in x. Then













Now we consider the return policy. Let p be the transaction price in an auction. Suppose
that the seller charges a fee c = γp if the winning bidder (winner) returns the object, where
8Generalization to the N-buyer case is straightforward and none of the main results will change. There
is no need to complicate the notations further.
4γ ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, the winner receives a refund of (1−γ)p. Here, we assume that there is
no transaction cost for returns on both sides. We focus on the case where γ > 0. If γ = 0,
there could be multiple equilibria with every bidder bidding higher than or equal to VH.9
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. Nature moves ﬁrst and selects V = VH or V = VL. Conditional on V , each bidder
draws a signal independently.
2. Either a ﬁrst-price or second-price auction with return policy γ is held, and the winner
is determined.
3. The winner learns the true value of the object and decides whether or not to return
the object for a refund.
We assume that the winner can learn about the true value of V after the auction ends.
In online auctions, after a buyer receives the object, he would learn more about its value.
In auctions for oil, gas and mineral rights, uncertainties resolve over time and the winner
will learn the true value eventually. In the analysis, we will focus on the symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with strictly increasing bidding function in the auction. We will start
by analyzing the last stage of the game, where the winner makes the return decision. In
the following section, we will examine the second-price auctions. We will then examine the
ﬁrst-price auctions in the subsequent section.
3 Second-price auctions
Let us ﬁrst examine the second-price auctions. The transaction price is equal to the second
highest bid in the auction. We assume that both bidders adopt the same strictly increas-
ing bidding function BS(·) in the auction stage. We can restrict our attention to bidding
functions taking values in [VL,VH]. This is because a buyer with the highest signal should
not bid more than VH; bidding more than VH would sometimes gives him a negative surplus
and is dominated by bidding VH; if a bidder with the lowest signal bids less than VL, then
by increasing his bid to VL he may win with a positive probability and thus get a positive
surplus.
Now consider the return stage. Assume that buyer 1 is the winner and his signal is x.
Suppose that he bids BS(˜ x), wins the auction, and pays BS(x2). If the realization of the
value of the object is V = VH, he will not return it since his payment is less than VH. If







9As we shall show later, when γ converges to zero, the equilibrium converges to the one where every
bidder bids VH. Furthermore, bidding more than VH is weakly dominated by bidding VH. Therefore, when
γ = 0, we pick the undominated equilibrium where every bidder bids VH.





















1−γ) < x, and the winner’s return decision is based on a cutoﬀ rule when
V = VL.
Note that in a two-bidder second-price common-value auction without return policies,
from Milgrom and Weber [14], a bidder with signal x would bid the expected object value
conditional on the other bidder having the same signal x:
E(V |x,x) =
µHVHfH(x)2 + µLVLfL(x)2













as the winning bidder’s loss as a percentage to the bidder’s bid when the value of the object
turns out to be VL. There are two cutoﬀs for γ that are important in the characterization of
the bidders’ equilibrium bidding function. (Recall that γ is the percentage of the transaction







The type of equilibrium we will obtain depends crucially on the value of γ. As shown
in the proof of Proposition 1, it turns out that if γ is lower than γS, the winning bidder
would always return the object whenever V = VL. If γ is higher than γS, the winning bidder
would never return the object when V = VL. If γ is intermediate, the winning bidder would
sometimes return the object when V = VL. Furthermore, the intervals for γ in the above
three cases do not overlap with each other and they cover the entire interval of (0,1]. Thus
we can conclude that a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for any
γ ∈ (0,1]. Deﬁne xS∗ as the solution to γ = ΓS(xS∗) for γ ∈ (γS,γS). Since ΓS(x) is
strictly increasing, xS∗ is unique and belongs to (x,x). These results are characterized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the second-price common value auction with return policy γ, the unique
symmetric equilibrium is characterized as follows in three cases.
6Case 1: If γ ≥ γS, each bidder adopts the following strictly increasing bidding function:
B
S(x) = B




The winning bidder never returns the object.







The winning bidder always returns the object whenever V = VL.







BS1(x), if x ≤ xS∗;
BS2(x), if x ≥ xS∗.
(7)
The winning bidder returns the object when V = VL if he pays more than BS(xS∗).
In Case 1 of the above proposition, since the return policy is never executed, the bidding
function coincides with the one with no return policy. Obviously, providing a very strict
return policy is equivalent to no returns. The bidding function BS1(x) corresponds to the
one in Milgrom and Weber [14].
In Case 2, the function BS2(x) is in fact the equilibrium bidding function for the game
when the winner is forced to return the object if the realized value is VL. It is equal to the
price that the bidder will break even if he pays that price (i.e., the other bidder also has signal
x) and gets VH when V = VH, and pays γ percent of that price and gets 0 when V = VL.
That is, BS2(x) is the solution to (VH − B)µHfH(x)2 + (−γB)µLfL(x)2 = 0. When VL = 0,
this bid is equivalent to the expected object value of a bidder with signal x conditional on
the other bidder having the same signal x and returning the object with probability 1 − γ
when V = VL.
In Case 3, whether the winning bidder returns the object or not depends on how much
he pays. It is easy to show that BS1(x) ≥ BS2(x) for x ≤ xS∗ and BS1(x) ≤ BS2(x) for
x ≥ xS∗ with equality at the cutoﬀ xS∗. Therefore, the bidding function is the maximum
of the two functions in Cases 1 and 2. However, as we shall show in the next section, this
pattern is not valid for ﬁrst-price auctions.
Given any return policy γ ∈ (0,1], there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. When
γ → 0, BS(x) → VH. We know that when γ = 0, there are many equilibria. First, bidding VH
and the winner always returns the object when V = VL and keeps the object when V = VH is
7an equilibrium. Second, bidding any amount more than VH and the winner returns the object
all the time is also an equilibrium. However, bidding more than VH is weakly dominated by
bidding VH. Thus, for simplicity and continuity, we select the equilibrium with BS(x) = VH
and the winner always returns the object whenever V = VL and keeps the object whenever
V = VH as the equilibrium for γ = 0. This is captured in Case 2 with γ = 0.
4 First-price auctions
Now we examine ﬁrst-price auction with returns. Here, the transaction price is the winning
bid. Again, we focus on an equilibrium where every bidder adopts the same strictly increasing
bidding function BF(·). Similarly to the second-price auctions, we can establish the range
of the bidding function to be a subset of [VL,VH].
We ﬁrst examine the winning bidder’s return decision. Suppose that a bidder has signal
x but bids BF(˜ x). If he wins, he pays BF(˜ x) for the object. When the realization of the
object value is V = VH, he will keep the object, since he pays less than VH. When V = VL,
he will return the object if VL < (1 − γ)BF(˜ x), i.e., ˜ x > (BF)−1(
VL
1−γ). As result, there can
only be three diﬀerent situations in the return stage. Case 1: (BF)−1(
VL
1−γ) ≥ x, and thus
the winner keeps the object all the time. Case 2: (BF)−1(
VL
1−γ) ≤ x, and thus the winner
returns the object all the time when V = VL. Case 3: x < (BF)−1(
VL
1−γ) < x, and thus the














Lemma 2 L1(α|x) and L2(α|x;γ) are both proper c.d.f.’s of α with support [x,x].
Note that in a two-bidder second-price common-value auction without return policies,

























8as the winning bidder’s loss as a percentage to the bidder’s bid when the value of the object
turns out to be VL. Since the bidding function (10) is strictly increasing, ΓF(x) is strictly
increasing. As in the second-price auctions, there are two cutoﬀs for γ that are important







Note that ΓF(x) = ΓS(x).
As in the second-price auctions, γ plays an important role in the return decision. Deﬁne
xF∗ as the solution to γ = ΓF(xF∗) for γ ∈ (γF,γF). Since ΓF(x) is strictly increasing, xF∗











Similar to the second-price auctions, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a ﬁrst-price common value auction with return policy γ, the unique sym-
metric equilibrium can be characterized as follows in three cases.









The winning bidder never returns the object.









The winning bidder always returns the object when V = VL.







BF1(x), if x ≤ xF∗,
BF2(x) + AL2(xF∗|x;γ), if x ≥ xF∗.
(17)
9The winning bidder returns the object if he pays more than BF(xF∗) when V = VL.
In Case 1 of the above proposition, since the return policy is never executed, the bidding
function coincides with the one with no return policy. A very strict return policy is equivalent
to not allowing returns. The bidding function BF1(x) corresponds to the one in Milgrom
and Weber [14]. In Case 2, the function BS2(x) is in fact the equilibrium bidding function
for the auction when the winner is forced to return the object if the realized value is VL. In
Case 3, however, the bidding function is no long the maximum of the two individual bidding
functions in Cases 1 and 2 as in the second-price auctions.
For the same reason as in the second-price auctions, we choose the equilibrium with
BF(x) = VH and the winner always returns the object whenever V = VL and keeps the
object whenever V = VH as the equilibrium for γ = 0. This is captured in Case 2 with γ = 0
in the above proposition.
5 Revenue ranking
In this section, we shall make several comparisons in revenue. Suppose that the seller’s
reservation value of the object is V0.10 Consider a return policy with percentage fee of γ for
returns. Suppose that the seller implements a more generous return policy (i.e., a lower γ).
There are three eﬀects. First, buyers bid more aggressively. This is a positive eﬀect. Second,
when the winner returns the object, the seller gets a smaller portion of the transaction price.
This is a negative eﬀect. Third, because the cost for returning is lower, the probability of
the object being returned to the seller is higher. The eﬀect on the eﬃciency of the object
allocation could be positive or negative, depending on whether the seller’s reservation value
is higher or lower than the object value. We call the sum of the ﬁrst two eﬀects the payment
eﬀect, and the third eﬀect the eﬃciency eﬀect. The seller can improve her revenue by
balancing the trade-oﬀ between the payment eﬀect and the eﬃciency eﬀect.
In what follows, we shall ﬁrst examine the special case of VL = 0, and then the general
case. We denote the case of VL = 0 the benchmark. In this case, the object is either in
perfect condition (high common value), or totally useless (zero common value). The winner
always keeps the object when the realized common value is high, and always returns it when
the realized common value is zero, regardless of the return policy. Because the return policy
does not alter the allocation of the object, there is no eﬃciency variation among diﬀerent
return policies. This allows us to focus on the role of return policy on the payment eﬀect.
Analytically, we can make use of the linkage principle and show how the return policy aﬀects
the revenue in this case.11
10It is reasonable to assume that V0 < VH; otherwise, the seller will not have any incentive trying to sell
the object.
11Unfortunately, when VL 6= 0, the allocation of the object is aﬀected by the return policy and the linkage
principle does not apply.
105.1 The linkage principle in the benchmark
Let M(˜ x,x) be the expected payment by a bidder with signal x but reported ˜ x. We have
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let A and B be two auctions with return policies. In both auctions, the
bidder with the highest bid wins. Furthermore, the winner always keeps the object if V =
VH, and always returns it if V = VL. Suppose that in each auction, there is a symmetric
and strictly increasing equilibrium bidding function with the properties that (i) for all x,
MA
2 (x,x) ≥ MB
2 (x,x); (ii) MA(x,x) = MB(x,x) = 0. Then the seller’s expected revenue
from A is at least as large as the expected revenue from B.
In the benchmark, VL = 0. Given any return policy and auction format, the winner
with the highest bid wins; and the winner always returns the object when V = VL and
always keeps the object when V = VH. Thus, both ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions with
any return policy can be regarded as a mechanism in the above proposition. Note that the
equilibrium strategy for a second-price auction is characterized by Case 2 in Proposition 1,
and the equilibrium strategy for a ﬁrst-price auction is characterized by Case 2 in Proposition
2.
We can rank the expected revenues in the second-price auctions with diﬀerent γs as
follows.
Proposition 4 Suppose that VL = 0. Then the seller’s revenue is decreasing in γ in the
second-price auctions. That is, the more generous the return policy is, the more revenue a
second-price auction generates.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Bidders take into consideration of the
possible VL = 0 when they calculate their bids. The only situation that γ aﬀects the seller’s
revenue is when there is some probability that the winning bidder will return the object.

























When γ decreases, BS2(x,γ) needs to increase to keep the equation binding. Furthermore,
because BS2(x,γ) has increased, γBS2(x,γ) needs to decrease to keep the equation binding.
11Now consider the seller’s revenue. The seller receives either BS2(x,γ) when V = VH or
γBS2(x,γ) when V = VL = 0, if the other bidder’s signal (denoted by y) is higher. In this



















where y > x. Note our previous assumption that ρ(x) is an increasing function, implying
ρ(y) > ρ(x). Therefore, when γ decreases, the increase in BS2 together with the decrease
in γBS2 keeping the left-hand side of (19) constant will increase the value of (20), and thus
will increase the seller’s revenue. In other words, because the seller receives the bid of a ﬁrst
bidder only when the second bidder has a higher signal, and this higher signal makes V = VH
more likely to occur than the probability used in the ﬁrst bidder’s calculation. Therefore,
the total expected revenue for the seller is higher.
Similar ranking in the ﬁrst-price auctions with diﬀerent γs can be obtained as well. We
have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that VL = 0. Then the seller’s revenue is decreasing in γ in the
ﬁrst-price auctions. That is, the more generous the return policy is, the more revenue a
ﬁrst-price auction generates.
The above two propositions illustrate that the payment eﬀect is positive in both auctions
when VL = 0. Since the eﬃciency eﬀect vanishes when VL = 0, a more generous return policy
increases the seller’s revenue. This implies that the full refund policy (γ = 0) is the best
return policy. With the full refund policy, in both auctions, all buyers bid up to VH; and the
winner keeps the object when V = VH and returns it when V = VL = 0. Thus, the seller
extracts all possible surplus and the buyers earn zero surplus. As a result, both auctions
with full refund policy implement the optimal mechanism which extracts all surplus. This
is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that VL = 0. Then either the ﬁrst-price or second-price auction with
full refund policy implements the optimal mechanism.
In what follows, we compare the revenues in the ﬁrst-price and the second-price auctions
given the same γ. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that VL = 0. Given the same return policy γ, a second-price auction
generates at least as much revenue as a ﬁrst-price auction.
12This proposition shows that the result in Milgrom and Weber [14] that second-price auc-
tions generates weakly more revenue than ﬁrst-price auctions can be generalized to auctions
with return policies. In Milgrom and Weber [14], the result can be derived directly from the
linkage principle. In contrast, the linkage principle cannot be applied to auctions with return
policies. This is because for the linkage principle to work, the diﬀerence between the two
expected payment functions must be increasing in a bidder’s reported type. This property is
satisﬁed among second-price auctions with diﬀerent γs, as well as among ﬁrst-price auctions
with diﬀerent γs. But when we compare a ﬁrst-price auction with a second-price auction
with the same γ, the property is no longer valid. (See the proof of this proposition for de-
tails.) Nevertheless, revenue ranking is still possible here. This is because in a second-price
auction, the seller receives the bid of a bidder only when the other bidder has a higher signal,
and this higher signal makes V = VH more likely to happen than the ﬁrst bidder originally
thought. That is, the object gets returned less often in the seller’s revenue calculation than
in a bidder’s surplus calculation. However, this eﬀect is absent in the ﬁrst-price auction.
Therefore, the total expected revenue for the seller is higher in the second-price auction.
5.2 The general case
Now we consider the general case, where VL 6= 0. In this case, the linkage principle does
not apply, since diﬀerent return policies generate diﬀerent allocations of the object being
auctioned. As the equilibrium bidding function in ﬁrst-price auctions is very complex, we
focus on the second-price auctions here. First-price auctions should have qualitatively similar
results. We have the following proposition which is similar to Proposition 4.
Proposition 7 Suppose that VL ≤ V0. Then the seller’s revenue is decreasing in γ in the
second-price auctions. That is, the more generous the return policy is, the more revenue
the auction will generate. Furthermore, the second-price auction with the full refund policy
implements the optimal mechanism.
As is shown in the proof, the payment eﬀect is always positive in the second-price auctions.
When VL 6= 0 but VL ≤ V0, the eﬃciency eﬀect is positive since the return policy improves
eﬃciency. Therefore, the total eﬀect is positive, which implies that a more generous return
policy again increases the seller’s revenue and the full refund policy is optimal. The intuition
for this proposition is exactly the same as Proposition 4.
When VL > V0, the eﬃciency eﬀect is negative. In this case, the net eﬀect of a more
generous return policy depends on which of the two eﬀects (the payment eﬀect and the ef-
ﬁciency eﬀect) dominates. The following example shows that the optimal return policy can
be a full refund, no refund or partial refund policy.
Example: Suppose that V0 = 0, VH = 1, VL to be speciﬁed, with µH = µL = 0.5. For
x ∈ [0,1], FH(x) = x2, FL(x) = 2x − x2, Then fH(x) = 2x, fL(x) = 2 − 2x, and ρ(x) = x
1−x.
13Note that ρ(x) is indeed strictly increasing as we previously assumed. We will vary the value
of VL and let VL take the values of 0.02, 0.25, 0.28, and 0.5, respectively. Figure 1 puts all
values of VL in one ﬁgure, while the rest of the ﬁgures each illustrate one value of VL. When
VL = 0.02, the seller’s revenue is decreasing and then increasing in γ with the minimum
reached at γ = 0.97; the optimal return policy is the full refund policy. When VL = 0.25, the
seller’s revenue ﬁrst increases, then decreases, and then increases in γ; the optimal return
policy is a partial refund policy with γ = 0.82%. When VL = 0.28, the seller’s revenue ﬁrst
increases, then decreases, and then increases in γ; the optimal return policy is the no refund
policy. When VL = 0.5, the seller’s revenue is increasing in γ; the no refund policy is optimal
again.



























Figure 1: The seller’s revenue as function of γ for diﬀerent VL




















Figure 2: The seller’s revenue as function of γ when VL = 0.02






















Figure 3: The seller’s revenue as function of γ when VL = 0.25





















Figure 4: The seller’s revenue as function of γ when VL = 0.28





















Figure 5: The seller’s revenue as function of γ when VL = 0.5
196 Conclusion
This paper investigates how return policies aﬀect buyers’ bidding strategies in ﬁrst-price
and second-price auctions and the respective seller’s revenue. Providing a return policy
undoubtedly induces buyers to bid more aggressively. When the lowest value of the object is
zero, the more generous a return policy is, the more expected revenue the auction generates.
This is true for both the ﬁrst-price and the second-price auctions. The standard results in
Milgrom and Weber [14] that second-price auction generate more revenue than ﬁrst-price
auctions in common value auctions can be extended to the case of return policies. When the
lowest value of the object is non-zero but still lower than the seller’s reservation value, the
revenue is again higher when the return policy is more generous in the second-price auctions.
Auctions with return policies are more complicated to analyze than standard auctions,
as the winning bidder may return the object when he discovers the object’s true values.
Therefore, a higher bid induced by a more generous return policy may not be beneﬁcial
to the sellers. This paper shows that when the eﬃciency losses from the returns are not
signiﬁcant, a more generous return policy helps the sellers. Since a seller can also use return
policies to signal the quality of the object, we should expect to see return policies in many
auctions as we have witnessed in online auctions, where buyers have less conﬁdence in the
quality of the objects.
7 Appendix
Proof for Proposition 1
Case 1: Never return
We ﬁrst characterize the symmetric equilibrium bidding function in the case where the
winning bidder never returns the object after winning. Let BS1(·) denote the bidding function
in this case. Consider buyer 1. Suppose that buyer 1’s signal is x and he pretends to have
signal ˜ x and bids BS1(˜ x). Given that when the realization of the value is VL, bidder 1 will
keep the object if he wins, his expected surplus in the auction is given by:
Π
S1(x, ˜ x) = Pr(V = VH|x1 = x)E{[V − B
S1(x2)]I{x2 < ˜ x}|x1 = x,V = VH} (21)
+Pr(V = VL|x1 = x)E{[V − B











µH(x) ≡ Pr(V = VH|x1 = x) (24)
=
Pr(x1 = x|V = VH)Pr(V = VH)






and where µL(x) = Pr(V = VL|x1 = x) = 1 − µH(x). It is important to note that µH(x) is
increasing in x and µL(x) is decreasing in x. Therefore,
∂ΠS1(x, ˜ x)
∂˜ x
= µH(x)[VH − B
S1(˜ x)]fH(˜ x) + µL(x)[VL − B
S1(˜ x)]fL(˜ x)
= [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + µL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µH(x)VHfH(˜ x) + µL(x)VLfL(˜ x)




= [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + µL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µHfH(x)VHfH(˜ x) + µLf(x)VLfL(˜ x)




= [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + µL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µHVHρ(x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL



















The FOC is usually only a necessary condition. We shall show below that the FOC
is also a suﬃcient condition for the above maximization problem. It is easy to check that
µHVHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)+µLVL
µHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)+µL is increasing in x. Therefore, given the bidding function deﬁned in equation
(29), the surplus function ΠS1(x, ˜ x) is a unimodal function with the maximum at ˜ x = x; i.e.,




= [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + µL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µHVHρ(x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL
µHρ(x)ρ(˜ x) + µL
−
µHVHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL
µHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µL
#
(31)
≥ [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + µL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µHVHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL
µHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µL
−
µHVHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL








= [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + µL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µHVHρ(x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL
µHρ(x)ρ(˜ x) + µL
−
µHVHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL
µHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µL
#
(35)
≤ [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + µL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µHVHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL
µHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µL
−
µHVHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + µLVL




Therefore, ˜ x = x is indeed optimal and the suﬃciency of FOC for the maximization is
conﬁrmed. Of course, for the above bidding function to be an equilibrium, we need to
guarantee that the winner never wants to return the object. Note that the bidding function
is increasing. The condition of no return is equivalent to







Case 2: Always return when V = VL
In this case, the winning bidder always returns the object when V = VL. Given this,
buyer 1’s surplus when he pretends to have signal ˜ x is given by
Π
S2(x, ˜ x) = Pr(V = VH|x1 = x)E{[V − B
S2(x2)]I{x2 < ˜ x}|x1 = x,V = VH} (40)
+Pr(V = VL|x1 = x)
h
− E{γB












Taking the derivative with respect to ˜ x, we have
∂ΠS2(x, ˜ x)
∂˜ x
= µH(x)[VH − B
S2(˜ x)]fH(˜ x) − µL(x)γB
S2(˜ x)fL(˜ x)
= [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + γµL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µH(x)VHfH(˜ x)




= [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + γµL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µHfH(x)VHfH(˜ x)




= [µH(x)fH(˜ x) + γµL(x)fL(˜ x)]
"
µHVHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)




















The FOC is usually only a necessary condition. It is easy to check that
µHVHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)
µHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)+γµL is
increasing in x. Similar to the argument in Case 1, the surplus function ΠS2(x, ˜ x) is a
unimodal function with maximum at ˜ x = x when using the bidding function deﬁned in
equation (45). As a result, the suﬃciency of FOC for the maximization is conﬁrmed.
Again, for this bidding function to be in equilibrium, the condition for “always returning”
has to be satisﬁed. Given that the bidding function is increasing, this condition is equivalent
to







Case 3: Cutoﬀ rule when V = VL
In this case, there is an endogenously determined cutoﬀ in the winning bidder’s return
decision. We denote this cutoﬀ as xS∗. Buyer 1’s surplus by pretending to be have signal ˜ x
is given by
Π
S(x, ˜ x) =

     
     
ΠS1(x, ˜ x), if ˜ x ≤ xS∗;
µH(x)
nR ˜ x








, if ˜ x ≥ xS∗.
(48)
Note that the above function is continuous. Taking the derivative of the above with respect








∂˜ x , if ˜ x ≤ xS∗;
∂ΠS2(x,˜ x)
∂˜ x , if ˜ x ≥ xS∗.
(49)




∂˜ x . From the ﬁrst








µHρ(x)2+µL , if x ≤ xS∗;
BS2(x) =
µHVHρ(x)2
µHρ(x)2+γµL, if x ≥ xS∗.
(50)
Note that xS∗ is determined by
(1 − γ)B
S1(x






Note that functions BS2(x) and BS1(x) cross each other at xS∗.
Now consider the suﬃcient condition. Given the bidding function (50), from the proof in
Cases 1 and 2, we know that ΠS1(x, ˜ x) is a unimodal function with the maximum at ˜ x = x
when ˜ x ≤ xS∗ ; and ΠS2(x, ˜ x) is a unimodal function with the maximum at ˜ x = x when
˜ x ≥ xS∗. We shall show that ΠS(x, ˜ x) is also a unimodal function with maximum at ˜ x = x.
Consider x ≤ xS∗, for example. For x ≤ ˜ x ≤ x, the payoﬀ is increasing in ˜ x from the ﬁrst
formula of (49). For x ≤ ˜ x ≤ xS∗, the payoﬀ is decreasing in ˜ x from the ﬁrst formula of (49).
For xS∗ ≤ ˜ x ≤ x, the payoﬀ is decreasing in ˜ x from the second formula of (49). Therefore,
ΠS(x, ˜ x) achieves its maximal value at ˜ x = x. Similar arguments can be applied to the case
of x ≥ xS∗. Thus, the suﬃcient condition for the maximization is thus satisﬁed.
In this equilibrium, when V = VL, the winning bidder returns the object if he pays too
much, and keeps the object otherwise. For this to happen, γ has to satisfy the following
condition:
(1 − γ)B
S1(x) > VL > (1 − γ)B
S1(x) (53)
⇔ γ
S > γ > γ
S. (54)
Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 2
We only need to examine L2(α|x;γ) since L1(α|x) = L2(α|x;γ = 1). Note that the function
µHfH(x)fH(s)+γµLfL(x)fL(s)































fH(x)]}2 ≥ 0 (55)


















= ln[µHfH(x)FH(x) + γµLfL(x)FL(x)] − ln[µHfH(x)FH(x) + γµLfL(x)FL(x)] (59)
= ∞ (60)
Thus L2(x|x;γ) = 0. Moreover L2(x|x;γ) = 1 and L2(α|x;γ) is nondecreasing. As a result,
L2(α|x;γ) is a distribution function. Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 2
Case 1: Never return
Consider a bidder who has signal x and pretends to have ˜ x. Given that he always keeps the
object if he wins, his expected surplus is given by
Π
F1(x, ˜ x) = Pr(V = VH|x1 = x)E{[V − B
F1(˜ x)]I{x2 < ˜ x}|x1 = x,V = VH} (61)
+Pr(V = VL|x1 = x)E{[V − B
F1(˜ x)]I{x2 < ˜ x}|x1 = x,V = VL} (62)
= µH(x)[VH − B
F1(˜ x)]FH(˜ x) + µL(x)[VL − B
F1(˜ x)]FL(˜ x). (63)
Taking the derivative of the above with respect to ˜ x, we have
∂ΠF1(x, ˜ x)
∂˜ x












(˜ x)FL(˜ x) − B
F1(˜ x)fL(˜ x)]
= [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)] ×
25×
(
µH(x)fH(˜ x) + µL(x)fL(˜ x)
µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)
"
VHµH(x)fH(˜ x) + VLµL(x)fL(˜ x)











= [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)] ×
×
(
µHρ(x)fH(˜ x) + µLfL(˜ x)
µHρ(x)FH(˜ x) + µLFL(˜ x)
"
VHµHρ(x)ρ(˜ x) + VLµL




































The above diﬀerential equation (66) is just one of the necessary conditions for the equilib-





is nonnegative; otherwise, bidding





must also be nonpositive;
otherwise, the bidder with the lowest signal would be better to bid a little bit more. These
last two restrictions determine the boundary condition: BF1(x) =
VHµHρ(x)2+VLµL
µHρ(x)2+µL . With this









The bidding function is indeed increasing. Note that this bidding function can also be
formulated in the format of Milgrom and Weber [14], i.e., BF1(x) =
R x
x E(V |α,α)dL1(α|x).
In what follows, we shall show that ˜ x = x indeed maximizes the bidder’s surplus given
the above bidding function. In equation (64),
µHρ(x)fH(˜ x)+µLfL(˜ x)







µLµH[fH(˜ x)FL(˜ x) − fL(˜ x)FH(˜ x)]ρ0(x)







[µHρ(x)FH(˜ x) + µLFL(˜ x)]2 (69)
≥ 0, (70)
where the last inequality is implied from the second part of Lemma 1. Similarly,
VHµHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)+VLµL
µHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)+µL






















= [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)] × (75)
×
(
µHρ(x)fH(˜ x) + µLfL(˜ x)
µHρ(x)FH(˜ x) + µLFL(˜ x)
"
VHµHρ(x)ρ(˜ x) + VLµL












> [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)] × (77)
×
(
µHρ(x)fH(˜ x) + µLfL(˜ x)
µHρ(x)FH(˜ x) + µLFL(˜ x)
"
VHµHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + VLµL












> [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)] × (79)
×
(
µHρ(˜ x)fH(˜ x) + µLfL(˜ x)
µHρ(˜ x)FH(˜ x) + µLFL(˜ x)
"
VHµHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + VLµL

















= [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)] × (83)
×
(
µHρ(x)fH(˜ x) + µLfL(˜ x)
µHρ(x)FH(˜ x) + µLFL(˜ x)
"
VHµHρ(x)ρ(˜ x) + VLµL












< [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)] × (85)
×
(
µHρ(x)fH(˜ x) + µLfL(˜ x)
µHρ(x)FH(˜ x) + µLFL(˜ x)
"
VHµHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + VLµL












< [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)FL(˜ x)] × (87)
×
(
µHρ(˜ x)fH(˜ x) + µLfL(˜ x)
µHρ(˜ x)FH(˜ x) + µLFL(˜ x)
"
VHµHρ(˜ x)ρ(˜ x) + VLµL













As a result, the payoﬀ function ΠF1(x, ˜ x) is a unimodal function of ˜ x with its maximum at
˜ x = x, i.e., it is increasing when ˜ x ≤ x and decreasing when ˜ x ≥ x. Thus, ˜ x = x indeed
maximizes the bidder’s surplus.
27Note that for the bidding function to form an equilibrium, the condition of “Never return”
must be satisﬁed. Because the bidding function is increasing, “Never return” is equivalent
to
(1 − γ)B







































Case 2: Always return when V = VL
In this case, the winning bidder always returns the object when V = VL. A bidder’s
surplus when having signal x but pretending to be ˜ x is given by
Π
F2(x, ˜ x) = Pr(V = VH|x1 = x)E{(V − B
F(˜ x))I{x2 < ˜ x}|x1 = x,V = VH} (95)
−Pr(V = VL|x1 = x)E{γB
F(˜ x)I{x2 < ˜ x}|x1 = x,V = VL} (96)
= µH(x)[VH − B
F(˜ x)]FH(˜ x) − µL(x)γB
F(˜ x)FL(˜ x). (97)
Taking the derivative of the above with respect to ˜ x, we have
∂ΠF2(x, ˜ x)
∂˜ x
= µH(x)[VHfH(˜ x) − B
F2 0




(˜ x)FL(˜ x) − γB
F2(˜ x)fL(˜ x)]
= [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + γµL(x)FL(˜ x)] ×
×
(
µH(x)fH(˜ x) + γµL(x)fL(˜ x)
µH(x)FH(˜ x) + γµL(x)FL(˜ x)
"
VHµH(x)fH(˜ x)











= [µH(x)FH(˜ x) + γµL(x)FL(˜ x)] ×
×
(
µHρ(x)fH(˜ x) + γµLfL(˜ x)
µHρ(x)FH(˜ x) + γµLFL(˜ x)
"
VHµHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)
















































must be nonpositive; otherwise, the bidder with the lowest sig-
nal would be better bidding a little bit more. These two conditions determine the boundary
condition: BF2(x) =
VHµHρ(x)2
µHρ(x)2+γµL. With this boundary condition, we obtain the following








The bidding function is indeed increasing.
In what follows, we shall show that ˜ x = x indeed maximizes the bidder’s surplus given
the above bidding function. In equation (98), it is easy to see that
µHρ(x)fH(˜ x)
µHρ(x)FH(˜ x)+γµLFL(˜ x) and
VHµHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)+γVLµL
µHρ(x)ρ(˜ x)+γµL are both increasing in x. Following a similar argument as in Case 1, we
can show that the payoﬀ function ΠF2(x, ˜ x) is a unimodal function of ˜ x with its maximum
at ˜ x = x given the bidding function, i.e., it is increasing when ˜ x ≤ x and decreasing when
˜ x ≥ x. Therefore, ˜ x = x indeed maximizes the bidder’s payoﬀ.
This equilibrium bidding function is based on the condition that the winning bidder
always returns the object if V = VL, which is equivalent to
(1 − γ)B
F2(x) ≥ VL, (102)





dL2(α|x;γ) ≥ VL (103)









Case 3: Cutoﬀ rule when V = VL
In this case, there is an endogenously determined cutoﬀ in the winning bidder’s return
29decision. We denote this cutoﬀ as xF∗. A bidder 1’s surplus by pretending to be have signal
˜ x is given by
Π
F(x, ˜ x) =
(
ΠF1(x, ˜ x), if ˜ x ≤ xF∗;
ΠF2(x, ˜ x), if ˜ x ≥ xF∗. (106)








∂˜ x , if ˜ x ≤ xF∗;
∂ΠF2(x,˜ x)
∂˜ x , if ˜ x ≥ xF∗.
(107)
Note that the above payoﬀ function is continuous.
If x ≤ xF∗, the necessary condition for the optimization implies that BF(x) = BF1(x).
This bidding function also pins down the cutoﬀ xF∗, which is determined by BF1(xF∗) =
VL
1−γ.
For x ≥ xF∗, the ﬁrst order condition is again given by equation (98), but the initial condition
is diﬀerent and is replaced by BF2(xF∗) =
VL































BF1(x), if x ≤ xF∗;
BF2(x) + AL2(xF∗|x;γ), if x ≥ xF∗.
(111)
In what follows, we shall show that ˜ x = x indeed maximizes the bidder’s surplus given
the above bidding function. Given the bidding function (111), from the proof in Cases 1 and
2, we know that ΠF1(x, ˜ x) is a unimodal function with its maximum at ˜ x = x when ˜ x ≤ xF∗;
and ΠF2(x, ˜ x) is a unimodal function with its maximum at ˜ x = x when ˜ x ≥ xF∗. Consider
x ≤ xF∗. For x ≤ ˜ x ≤ x, the payoﬀ function is increasing in ˜ x from the ﬁrst part of (107).
For x ≤ ˜ x ≤ xF∗, the payoﬀ function is decreasing in ˜ x from the ﬁrst part of (107). For
xF∗ ≤ ˜ x ≤ x, the payoﬀ is decreasing in ˜ x from the second part of (107). Similar arguments
30can be made for x ≥ xF∗.
In this equilibrium, the winning bidder returns the object if he pays too much, and keeps
the object otherwise. For this to happen, γ has to satisfy the following condition:
(1 − γ)B
F1(x) > VL > (1 − γ)B
F1(x) (112)





















F < γ < γ
F. (114)
The proposition summarizes the equilibrium characterization. Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 3
The expected payoﬀ of a bidder with signal x but pretending to be ˜ x is
VHµH(x)FH(˜ x) − M(˜ x,x). (115)
In equilibrium, it is optimal to choose ˜ x = x and the resulting ﬁrst-order condition implies
that
M1(x,x) = VHµH(x)fH(x). (116)
The seller’s expected revenue from this buyer is given by











1 (x,x) − M
B
1 (x,x) + M
A
2 (x,x) − M
B
2 (x,x) (119)
= VHµH(x)fH(x) − VHµH(x)fH(x) + M
A





2 (x,x) − M
B
2 (x,x) ≥ 0. (121)
The inequality above is by assumption. Since ∆(x) = 0, we conclude that for all x, ∆(x) ≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 4
31When VL = 0, in the second-price auctions,
M









Note that µH(x) + µL(x) = 0. Then µ0
H(x) = −µ0
L(x) and µ0
H(x) > 0. Therefore,
M
S2





































[µHρ(x2)2 + γµL]2 dx2 < 0 (125)
Thus, from Proposition 3, the seller’s revenue is decreasing in γ. Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 5
When VL = 0, in the ﬁrst-price auctions,
M
F2(˜ x,x;γ) = µH(x)B
F2(˜ x)FH(˜ x) + µL(x)γB
F2(˜ x)FL(˜ x). (126)
M
F2













µHρ(α)2 + γµL | {z }
denote as K(α,x,γ)
dL2(α|x;γ) (128)
















[µHfH(s)FH(s) + γµLfL(s)FL(s)]2ds ≥ 0. (129)
From Lemma 2, we know that L2(α|x;γ) is a distribution. This means that, for γ1 ≤ γ2,
L2(α|x;γ1) ﬁrst order stochastic dominates L2(α|x;γ2). Deﬁne γ∗ =
FH(x)
FL(x). For γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ∗,
M
F2





















The ﬁrst inequality holds because K(α,x,γ) is decreasing in γ. The second inequality
holds because K(α,x,γ) is increasing in α and L2(α|x,γ1) ﬁrst order stochastic dominates
L2(α|x,γ2). Thus MF2
2 (x,x;γ)) is decreasing in γ for γ ≤ γ∗.


























































2 (x,x;γ) is decreasing in γ for γ ≥ γ∗. As a result, MF2
2 (x,x;γ) is decreasing in
γ all the time. Therefore, from Proposition 3, the seller’s revenue is decreasing in γ. Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 6
From equation (124) and equation (128),
M
S2






















































The last equality makes use of integration by parts. Since L2(α|x;γ) is increasing in γ and
FH(α)−γFL(α)
FH(x)−γFL(x) is decreasing in γ, P(α,x,γ) is increasing in γ. Since P(α,x,0) = 0, P(α,x,γ) is
always positive.
µHVHρ(α)2
µHρ(α)2+γµL is increasing in γ. Therefore, the integration is always positive.
As a result, sign[MS2
2 (x,x;γ) − MF2
2 (x,x,γ)] =sign[FH(x) − γFL(x)], which could be either
positive or negative. Hence, the linkage principle cannot be applied here to rank the revenues.































































It is straightforward to show that W(α,x,γ) can be regarded as a distribution for α on [x,x].
Furthermore, since
µHfH(x)fH(s)+γµLfL(x)fL(s)


























Thus, W(α,x,γ) ﬁrst order stochastic dominates L2(α|x;γ). Since
µHVHρ(α)2
µHρ(α)2+γµL is an increas-
ing function of α, we can conclude that MS2(x,x;γ) ≥ MF2(x,x;γ). Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 7
Since the linkage principle cannot be applied for revenue ranking, we will do a direct com-
parison. Below, we examine the seller’s revenue in the second-price auctions in three cases.
Let RS(γ) denote the seller’s expected revenue as a function of γ.
Case 1: γ ≥ γS.























[µH(1 − FH(x2))fH(x2) + µL(1 − FL(x2))fL(x2)]dx2. (156)


























































−[µHρ(x2)2 + γµL]2µH[1 − FH(x2)]fH(x2) (162)
+
µHVHρ(x2)2µHρ(x2)2

























dx2 ≤ 0 (165)
The inequality follows the ﬁrst part of Lemma 1. Thus, R0(γ) ≤ 0; the seller’s revenue is
decreasing in γ.


























xS∗ V0[1 − FL(x2)]fL(x2)dx2, (167)




































































































(VL − V0)[1 − FL(xS∗)]fL(xS∗)2[VHµHρ(xS∗) + µLVL]2
2VLµH(VH − VL)fH(xS∗)ρ0(xS∗)
| {z }
effciency effect≤0 if VL≤V0 and >0 if VL>V0
(169)
Therefore, the seller’s revenue is decreasing in γ if VL ≤ V0. It is easy to verify that the
revenue function is continuous for the entire domain of γ and thus is decreasing for γ ∈ [0,1].
Q.E.D.
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